



**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FINAL REPORT ON THE PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
JANUARY 9, 2005**

**NDI WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH
SUPPORTED THE INSTITUTE'S ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION**

Copyright © National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) 2005. All rights reserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced and/or translated for noncommercial purposes provided NDI is acknowledged as the source of the material and is sent copies of any translation.

2030 M Street NW
Washington DC
20036-3306
tel: +1(202)728 5500
fax: +1(202)728 5520
www.ndi.org

Abu Rumeleh Bld, Khalil Sakhakini St.
P.O.Box 17311
Beit Hanina, Jerusalem
tel:+972(0)2 583 7447, 583 7448
fax:+972(0) 2 583 7449
www.ndi-wbg.org

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

Build Political and Civic Organizations: NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions—the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

Safeguard Elections: NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and governments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and to recommend improvements. The Institute also provides technical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring, having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

Promote Openness and Accountability: NDI responds to requests from leaders of government, parliament, political parties and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures to constituent service to the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. The Institute works to build legislatures and local governments that are professional, accountable, open and responsive to their citizens.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	6
INTRODUCTION	10
POLITICAL CONTEXT	11

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The National Democratic Institute would like to express its appreciation to The Carter Center and President Jimmy Carter for their partnership in this observation effort and the Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the invitation of the Palestinian Central Election Commission (CEC), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), in partnership with The Carter Center (TCC), organized a 76-

of the Commission. NDI hopes that the action taken by the election officials will deter similar misconduct during the upcoming legislative polls.

THE USE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY WAS PROBLEMATIC; THE NEWLY COMPILED VOTER LIST WAS RELIABLE AND SOUND.

In September and October of 2004, the CEC established voter registration centers across the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem to create an entirely new registry of voters. NDI mounted an observer mission that judged the exercise as successful, with the exception of East Jerusalem. This effort was supplemented with the re-opening of registration centers in November. Approximately 71 percent of eligible voters were estimated to have been captured by the process and had their names inscribed on the voter list.

Despite the success of the voter registration process, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) amended the election law in November 2004 to require the CEC additionally to permit any eligible voter whose name appeared on the civil registry to vote. The civil registry is a document compiled for purposes unrelated to voting. It is known to be inaccurate, containing the names of hundreds of thousands of people who have died or emigrated. To comply with the law, the CEC established two types of polling centers: one for those who had registered, "regular" polling centers, and another for those whose names only appeared on the civil registry, "special" polling centers. Seventy special voting centers were established throughout the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the more than G appcaocwme64eermRELIAc50to

Israeli post office agreed to allow voting at the post office stations, under international supervision, by those holding valid IDs and the receipt that was proof of voter registration, regardless of whether or not their names appeared on the voter list.

This new procedure relieved tensions at many of the post offices, and allowed many eligible voters who might otherwise have been refused, to cast their ballots during the late afternoon and evening of election day. Unfortunately, this new arrangement was not communicated clearly or in writing to the Israeli postal officials required to give it effect, or the international observers, including those from the NDI delegation, expected to oversee the new procedure. Nor were the public or the candidates advised in a timely or effective manner. As a result, there were different understandings of the agreement by election workers and the role expected of international observers in the process.

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES PLAYED A LARGELY POSITIVE ROLE FACILITATING THIS ELECTION;
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WAS EASED ON ELECTION DAY.

Israeli authorities took many helpful steps that materially assisted in the conduct of the presidential election. These included:

- A general relaxation of checkpoints and roadblocks on election day.
- The absence of a visible Israeli security presence at voting stations, notably in East Jerusalem. This was a substantial improvement from 1996.
- The establishment of a special center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that proved responsive to concerns raised by international observers, the CEC and others.
- Cooperation in the movement of CEC materials and personnel in preparation for election day.

However, it is also clear that problems and difficulties encountered in the course of the election process arose from conditions imposed for security reasons. Israel could contribute to the success of coming municipal and legislative elections by expanding and deepening its cooperation in a number of areas, most notably by expanding the freedom of movement during the campaign period and in facilitating voting in East Jerusalem.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Decision making mechanisms of the CEC should be formalized, public and transparent.
- 2) Palestinian and Israeli officials should consider reopening negotiations to ease voting in Jerusalem in preparation for the legislative elections.
- 3) The PLC should remove the use of the civil registry as a voter list in the election law; and the CEC should reopen voter registration to supplement the voter list in preparation for the legislative elections.
- 4) Greater freedom of movement should be provided to candidates, party activists and voters during the campaign period; election officials should receive greater freedom of movement well before the campaign begins.
- 5) More detailed regulations with enforceable sanctions are required to address issues of campaign finance and the use of public resources in campaigns.

- 6) To avoid repetition in future elections of the inappropriate pressure applied to the CEC on election day, a code of conduct for political parties should be developed and enforced.

INTRODUCTION

At the invitation of the CEC, NDI, in partnership with The Carter Center, organized a 76-member international delegation to monitor the January 2005 Palestinian presidential election. The delegation was led by former United States President Jimmy Carter, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and former New Jersey Governor and United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, and supported by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development. The delegation included former legislators and ambassadors, elections and human rights experts, civic leaders and regional specialists from 15 countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and North America.

The objectives of the mission were to: demonstrate the international community's continued interest in and support for the development of viable democratic institutions that will enable Palestinians to freely choose their leaders and representatives; and provide Palestinians and the international community with an impartial and accurate assessment of the election process and the political environment surrounding the election. The Institute conducted its assessment on the basis of international standards for election observation, comparative practices for democratic elections and respect for Palestinian law.

This observation mission was part of NDI's comprehensive effort to monitor Palestinian electoral processes. As part of this program, the Institute also observed the recent voter registration process and the first round of local elections, conducted in the West Bank on December 23, 2004 and the Gaza Strip on January 27, 2005. NDI plans to observe subsequent rounds of the local elections as well as the parliamentary elections.

An accurate and complete assessment of any election must take into account all aspects of the electoral process, as well as the political context in which it takes place. From December 13-20, 2004, NDI and The Carter Center conducted an assessment of the pre-election political environment. From January 5-8, 2005 delegation members held meetings with: presidential candidates; the chairman and representatives of the CEC; representatives of the news media; civic leaders; representatives of the European Union's Election Observation Mission; and senior Israeli government officials, including the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

This report is informed by the observations of the election day delegation, as well as those of the pre-election assessment team. It also draws upon the work of NDI's Jerusalem-based staff members who have been engaging with Palestinian political leaders and electoral authorities on a regular basis.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Following the death of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat¹ on November 11, 2004, the presidential election was scheduled for January 9, 2005 in accordance with Palestinian law.²

ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

Legal Framework. The conduct of the January 9, 2005 presidential election was governed by the Basic Law, the Palestinian election law (No. 13 of 1995) and its amendments (No. 16 of 1995 and December 2004 amendments), and presidential decrees. In addition, voting for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem was conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in the 1995 Declaration of Principles, Annex II, Article 6, "Election Arrangements Concerning Jerusalem"

There was no formal agreement between Israel and the Palestinians regarding registration for Jerusalemites during the process conducted in September and October, and the centers in East Jerusalem were shut down within 10 days of a planned five-week registration period by Israeli authorities. After the date for the presidential election was set, however, the CEC conducted door-to-door registration canvassing in East Jerusalem.

Registration by proxy was permitted for Palestinians who were in jail or detention, including those in Israeli custody. A case was taken to the Israeli High Court seeking to allow such prisoners to vote in the presidential election. The court rejected the petition on the grounds that it was not administratively feasible to organize voting in time for the election.

Despite the fact that more than 70 percent of eligible Palestinian voters were registered to vote, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) passed an amendment to the election law requiring the CEC to permit any eligible voter whose name appeared on the civil registry to vote, even if he had not registered with the CEC. This measure was taken ostensibly to permit as many eligible voters to cast ballots as possible. Political observers believe the decision was also designed to favor the dominant Fatah faction which sought to maximize voter turnout, which was considered an important indicator of support for Fatah and Abbas, especially in light of the election boycott by Hamas.

The civil registry was compiled for purposes unrelated to voting and is known to be inaccurate, containing the names of hundreds of thousands of people who have died or emigrated. The registry has been managed at times by Israeli authorities and at times by Palestinian authorities. Before the CEC could employ it, some data had to be translated from Hebrew to Arabic. Further complicating the matter, the respective authorities use different names and designations for some of the same geographic locations, as well as for some of the same proper names.

To comply with the law, the CEC established two types of polling centers: one for those who had registered, “regular” polling centers, and another for those whose names only appeared on the civil registry, “special” polling centers. It was determined that approximately 700,000 names appeared on the civil registry that were not on the CEC registry. Seventy special voting centers were established throughout the West Bank and Gaza, along with more than 1,000 regular polling centers.⁶ Registered voters returned to the center where they registered to vote; non-registered voters were assigned to a special center alphabetically by first name.

additional post office, bringing the total number to six. The CEC estimated that

FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

THIS ELECTION WAS A CLEAR EXPRESSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC WILL OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

As noted in NDI's preliminary statement, the January 9 Palestinian presidential election was a major accomplishment. The election was contested vigorously and administered fairly. Election day was orderly and generally peaceful. The process, organized in 60 days in accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law and under the difficult circumstances of the ongoing conflict and occupation, represents a step forward for Palestinian democracy. The successful organization of this election demonstrates the potential for the start of a new era in Palestinian politics and the development of representative and accountable governance.

The executive office of the CEC is professional and technically proficient. In general, the Commission organized and implemented a national election that met international standards. Election workers were well trained and were able to execute their responsibilities consistency and integrity. Many observers commented that election workers expressed a high degree of pride and enthusiasm in the importance and quality of their work.

In this election, most Palestinian eligible voters who wished to vote were able to do so.

RULE CHANGES ON ELECTION DAY WERE PROBLEMATIC, MADE UNDER DURESS, CAUSED CONFUSION AND CREATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR ELECTORAL MANIPULATION.

The January 9, 2005 presidential election was marked by a series of changes to rules and their application, which in itself became a source of confusion among voters, candidates, observers and election officials.

As noted in NDI's preliminary statement, election day changes to voter eligibility rules, to the application of eligibility rules, and to voting hours by the CEC commissioners undoubtedly enabled some Palestinians to vote who otherwise would have been frustrated in their desire to do so. The last minute changes, however, made in a non-transparent manner, and without consultation, were not communicated precisely and in a timely fashion to the public, candidates and election officials, and produced not only the perception but the likelihood of unfairness, creating opportunities for voting fraud or other forms of electoral manipulation.

CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING

The most significant rule change made by the CEC on election day was to permit Palestinians whose names did not appear on either the list of registered voters or the civil registry to vote simply with the presentation of a valid Palestinian or Jerusalemite identification card. In November 2004, the PLC passed legislation requiring the CEC to use the civil registry as a valid list of voters on election day, in addition to the new voter list the Commission had compiled during the voter registration process conducted a month earlier.

Early on election day, there appeared to be problems with the civil registry. Many voters complained that they were not able to find their name on the list. Others complained that they were not able to find the correct special center, or that because the assignments were made by first name, different members of the same family had to travel to different polling centers, causing confusion. The CEC claims to have received approximately 15,000 calls to its election day troubleshooting center, as well as direct calls to staff members and commissioners.

Mid-afternoon on election day, the CEC announced that eligible voters with a valid Palestinian or Jerusalem identification card would be able to vote at any of the special polling centers whether or not their name could be found on either the civil registry or the voter list. A two hour extension in voting was announced as well. The CEC commissioners explained at the time and in subsequent statements⁹ that these changes were made to accommodate voters who were turned away because of the confusion surrounding the civil registry and the special center assignments, as well as to ensure that members of the security forces, many of whom were on duty away from their places of residence, would be able to vote.

It is unclear whether the CEC commissioners had the legal authority to take such a procedural decision since the electoral law requires eligible voters to be listed on the register. Article 73 states, "The elector may be identified by means of the electoral registration card . . . the identity card, or any other document admitted for this purpose." Article 7D0.0002 T74TJ20.40at the tim0.8.0

DECISIONS TAKEN UNDER DURESS

Most seriously, the decisions taken by the CEC commissioners concerning the extension of voting hours and change in eligibility requirements were taken under duress and the threat of physical violence. Six days after the election, 46 members of the Commission resigned, stating that they were pressured to extend the voting hours and change voting procedures on election day.

At the release of its preliminary statement on January 10, NDI was unable to confirm allegations regarding these pressures. The delegation noted, however, that “concerns have been raised about the timing and need for such decisions.” The Institute has since had the opportunity to conduct interviews with several parties involved. In these interviews, several CEC commissioners as well as senior members of the administrative staff reported being pressured into making these changes by representatives and supporters of the Abbas campaign. Political contestants in the campaign and political observers have noted that last minute rule changes may have been motivated by a desire within the Abbas campaign to increase turnout figures.

THE USE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY WAS PROBLEMATIC; THE NEWLY COMPILED VOTER LIST WAS RELIABLE AND SOUND.

In September and October, the CEC established voter registration centers across the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem to create an entirely new registry of voters. NDI mounted an observer mission that judged the exercise as successful, with the exception of East Jerusalem. (The statement from NDI’s observer mission is attached.) This effort was supplemented with the re-opening of registration centers in November. Approximately 71 percent of eligible voters were estimated to have been captured by the process and had their names inscribed on the voter list.

Although there is a lively debate in many jurisdictions about the best method to compile a voter list, in NDI’s view the CEC’s chosen method was sound and had every prospect of producing a fair and honest process. Additionally, using the voter registration meer regbp 1(t)3.9(ered ie3a

Additionally, candidates and their campaign workers faced limitations on their activities in Jerusalem. A system was set up to allow candidates to apply for permits to enter Jerusalem and conduct campaign activities. However, no candidates were ever granted such explicit permits; they were only given permits to travel through Jerusalem on their way to Gaza, for example. Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi and Dr. Bassam al Salhi each encountered difficulties as they attempted to campaign in Jerusalem.

NDI invited several of the presidential candidates to address its observer delegation in the days before the election. The Institute was able to secure permits for their entry into Jerusalem where the meetings were held, but these permits were only valid for four hours.¹² Two of the candidates, Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi and Dr. Bassam al Salhi, were escorted out of Jerusalem by Israeli police almost immediately after addressing the delegation.

AN INADEQUATE AGREEMENT

In anticipation of the January 9, 2005 presidential election, the PA sought, and received from Israel, agreement to renew the arrangements for voting in East Jerusalem that had been developed for the 1996 elections. These were, in summary, that voting would be permitted at five Israeli post offices in East Jerusalem. (Israel later agreed to add a sixth post office.)

Voting at these post offices would be administered not by CEC officials, but rather by Arabic-speaking workers in the Israeli postal system. Voters would have their names checked against a voter list in the usual way, and would have their thumbs inked as elsewhere. However, their ballots would be deposited not in standard ballot boxes, but in special “receptacles” designed to resemble post boxes. The ballots would not be counted *in situ*, but transferred at the end of voting to CEC officials outside of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to do the counting.

The total number of voters who would be permitted by Israel to cast their ballots in these post offices, ostensibly because of space constraints, was fewer than 6,000. All other eligible voters would be required to vote outside of the Israeli muni

A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT CAMPAIGN ISSUES REMAIN UNADDRESSED AND UNREGULATED.

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES AND USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES

The Palestinian election law is limited in how it addresses campaign financing and spending. The only clear restrictions are that public and foreign funds may not be used, and that each partisan entity that participated in the election, as well as all *elected* candidates, must submit a report to the CEC within 20 days of the announcement of the final results detailing funding sources and expenditures. This means that independent candidates who do not win are free from any reporting requirements.

The CEC asked all presidential candidates to submit financial reports, whether or not they were technically required to by law. All but one of the candidates, Dr. Abd Al Karim Shbair, complied with the request. Two candidates who were legally bound to produce the financial reports missed the February 1 deadline for submission, Mahmoud Abbas and Taysir Khaled.

The reports largely took the form of general statements on expenditures and income. They did not contain itemized lists of funding sources or specific information on how money was spent or which vendors or individuals received payments from the campaigns. Based on the figures given by candidates, more than \$4.5 million was spent on this campaign.

Throughout the campaign, there were a number of questions raised by candidates and observers as to the use of funds. For example, Mahmoud Abbas' campaign was criticized for allegedly using state resources on behalf of his campaign. The CEC criticized some PA officials for campaigning for Mr. Abbas while on the public payroll: for example, uniformed Palestinian security forces appeared as supporters at some of Mr. Abbas' political events.

The election law is explicit about what the conduct of the governing authority must be during an election. Article 54 states, "The Palestinian Authority and all of its administrative or security bodies shall remain neutral throughout the different phases of the electoral process, and shall refrain from conducting any kind of activity which may benefit any candidate against others, or any partisan entity against others." Article 93, Section 3, states, "The Palestinian National Authority shall refrain from helping or financing the electoral campaign of any candidate."

Public resources, including government funds, vehicles, communications equipment, materials and work hours of government officials and employees belong to the citizens and should not be used for the benefit of any private individual or political party. This is a fundamental element of the principle of separation of party and government, as well as a broader issue of public trust. While it was difficult to verify the basis of the complaints and measure the impact of the issue, even a perception of misuse of public resources undermines public confidence in government.

Additionally, Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi was charged by other candidates with allegedly misusing funds and resources from his non-profit health organization, which his accusers maintained included foreign funding. Again, it was not possible for NDI to verify these charges, but the lack of a clear regulatory framework concerning the financing of campaigns certainly adds to the public perception of problems and mishandling of campaign resources and finances.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

The continuing violence in Gaza and some parts of the West Bank, hundreds of checkpoints, the barrier wall, temporary closures and other se

of sources, and it was likely that most voters would have been able to make an informed choice at the ballot box.

In addition to these matters, the PA as well as several of the candidates complained that many Palestinians, numbering in the thousands, had been prevented from returning from Egypt to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah checkpoint, which was closed after Palestinian militants set off an explosion in a tunnel beneath the Israeli military checkpoint. It was regrettable that a workable solution to this problem was not reached in time for them to vote in the election.

RECOMMENDATIONS

DECISION MAKING MECHANISMS OF THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION SHOULD BE FORMALIZED,

The CEC could use the months before the legislative elections, currently scheduled for July 2005, to supplement their original registry by reopening registration centers in the course of the spring. The CEC could also consider establishing permanent opportunities for voter registration through the district electoral offices, which would close within a reasonable amount of time before an election.

Modifications could also be made to the electoral law to allow the CEC to accommodate absentee, tendered ballot or proxy voting. Such ballots would not need to be included in polling station results, but could be tabulated in a District Office or centralized counting center.

The voter list is a public document and, according to the law, should be available for scrutiny of observers and elections stakeholders. Thus, the CEC should make the voter list accessible to accredited observers, political parties and candidates in a way that will enable them to verify the voter registration process. The Commission should also consider issuing a code of conduct for the use of the records in the voter list so that no abuse of this information occurs.

GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO CANDIDATES, PARTY ACTIVISTS AND VOTERS DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD. ELECTION OFFICIALS AND MATERIALS SHOULD RECEIVE GREATER ACCESS WELL BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS.

The experience of the easing of checkpoints and roadblocks in the 24 hours around the election demonstrates what is possible with sufficient coordination and cooperation. Israeli and Palestinian authorities should consider working together early to expand this policy to allow greater movement during the campaign, not only for candidates, but also for voters and rank-and-file party workers.

TO AVOID REPETITION IN FUTURE ELECTIONS OF THE INAPPROPRIATE PRESSURE APPLIED TO THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION ON ELECTION DAY, A CODE OF CONDUCT DEFINING TECHNICALLY LEGAL AND ETHICALLY ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR FOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND ENFORCED.

A fundamental element of a democratic society is an independent electoral body that can administer elections without fear of reprisal or threats of violence. Equally important is the right of individual citizens to campaign on behalf of a party or candidate, or engage in the civic activities of an election, without fear or concern for personal security.

In preparation for the legislative elections, the political parties, factions, movements and independent candidates should commit to a code of conduct. This code should be negotiated and monitored by Palestinian civil society organizations, ideally organizations that are already monitoring the overall campaign and election cycle. Breaches of the code should be publicized and any violation of the election law should be referred to prosecuting authorities or an elections tribunal that could be established for this purpose.

APPENDIX A

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE NDI INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE JANUARY 9, 2005 PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Jerusalem, January 10, 2005

This preliminary statement is offered by the National Democratic Institute's international election observer delegation to the January 9, 2005 Palestinian presidential election. The delegation, organized by NDI in partnership with The Carter Center, was led by former United States President Jimmy Carter, former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt and former Governor of New Jersey and Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency Christine Todd Whitman. It also included current and former legislators, former ambassadors, elections and human rights experts, civic leaders and regional specialists from 15 countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and North America. The delegation visited the Palestinian territories from January 4-10 and deployed 80 observers to the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

The delegation is part of NDI's comprehensive monitoring of Palestinian election processes, which is supported by USAID and which began with the September-October voter registration process and the December 2004 municipal elections. The Institute plans to continue through further municipal and Palestinian Legislative Council elections scheduled for 2005. The Institute issued a statement on the voter registration process, and NDI and The Carter Center issued a statement on the pre-election environment, both of which are available on NDI's web site at www.ndi.org. (Arabic versions are available at www.ndi-wbg.org).

The purposes of the delegation were twofold: to demonstrate the international community's

peaceful. The process, organized in just 60 days in accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law and under difficult circumstances of the ongoing conflict and occupation, represents a step forward for Palestinian democracy. The successful organization of this election demonstrates the potential for the start of a new era in Palestinian politics and the development of representative and accountable governance.

Having successfully conducted this presidential election, there are now opportunities to advance positive developments in a broader context necessary for peace and prosperity. Palestinians also face a number of immediate challenges as they move to consolidate their democratic institutions. They must quickly move to prepare for the next round of municipal and legislative elections, which are scheduled within the next six months. Palestinians also should enhance efforts to ensure public order and to curtail violence. It is important that the Palestinian President and his designated Prime Minister establish an effective working relationship, taking into account the 2003 amendments to the Basic Law, and the specific political, economic and social challenges facing Palestinian society today. Palestinians will require continued support from the international community and will need to build upon the Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in election planning that took place in this election period.

Election day was characterized by the following positive developments:

- A generally peaceful process, even though there were serious concerns beforehand that violence could disrupt the election;
- A mostly orderly election administration conducted by dedicated and professional officials;
- Large numbers of Palestinians who came out to cast their votes;
- The significant presence of political party and candidate agents, as well as nonpartisan domestic election observers, adding transparency to the process;
- The large role played by women in the election process as electoral officials, party and candidate agents, nonpartisan observers and voters; and
- The easing of travel through check points by Israeli authorities to facilitate freedom of movement and election day processes.

Election day, however, was not without problems, including the following developments:

- The large percentage of registered voters whose names did not appear on the

monitor developments until the process is completed and may issue additional statements or reports.

THE ELECTORAL CONTEXT

Upon the death of the President of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat, Palestinian political leaders moved in accordance with the Basic Law to schedule the January 9 presidential election. This demonstrated their political will to provide a smooth transition in accordance with the rule of law.

The successful completion of the election process will allow Palestinians to confirm that their chief executive was chosen by popular mandate in accordance with the will of the people. This would signal the determination of Palestinians to establish a democratic process by which leaders are elected and held accountable to the public. The completion of a democratic election process by Palestinians could set the stage for the development of responsive representatives and institutions of governance, which would have substantial positive implications here and throughout the region.

Legal Framework. The legal framework for the election was provided by the Basic Law and the Palestinian Election Law. Though not without shortcomings, they provide the general bases for democratic elections. In accordance with the Basic Law, the election had to take place within 60 days following the death of President Arafat. While providing for a speedy transition between elected presidents, the 60-day time limit created serious challenges for organizing the election, and the truncated 14-day official campaign provided little opportunity for new political leadership to emerge.

Election Administration. The Central Election Commission (CEC), which was formed in 2002 as an independent body, mobilized quickly and effectively to organize the election, taking advantage of having successfully conducted voter registration in late 2004. In the short period provided for the election, the CEC trained more than 16,000 electoral officials to staff the approximately 2,800 polling stations, the 16 District Election Commissions (DECs) and various support teams. It organized the printing and distribution of ballots and other materials, as well as their collection, and other logistical requirements. This was all the more impressive given the difficulties presented by the ongoing conflict.

The CEC enjoyed a high degree of confidence among Palestinians. It has in many instances demonstrated its ability to withstand political pressure and to perform its duties impartially and effectively—prerequisites for independent, nonbiased election administration. This was an essential accomplishment for organizing democratic elections. The successful completion of the presidential election will contribute substantially to confirming public confidence in the CEC's abilities to conduct future democratic elections, including those scheduled for this year.

The DECs and polling station officials are the subordinate election authorities, and their members are appointed by the CEC. The late appointment of the DECs on January 1 created some confusion in the organization of their work, although they appeared to accomplish their tasks by election day. The vast majority of electoral officials worked diligently and cooperated with candidate agents, as well as with domestic and international election observers. Electoral authorities also had to reconcile a number of competing and sensitive interests concerning registries of eligible voters, voting in East Jerusalem and the effects of

violence and Israeli security measures on the movement of personnel and material, particularly in Gaza.

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

Seven presidential candidates competed in the election, presenting Palestinians with a choice

For example, just two nights before the election there was a violent incident in Nablus in which Palestinian gunmen attacked two Israeli cars, killing one person and seriously wounding others. For a period, the Israeli military imposed a curfew on villages near Nablus, which raised concerns about electoral preparations, but no large-scale military action was taken.

Israeli officials did not allow candidates free access to Jerusalem during the campaign. One candidate successfully held a campaign meeting in Jerusalem after obtaining a permit. Another candidate, who had been granted permission to campaign in Jerusalem, declined to do so, reportedly because he was uncomfortable with the likely presence of Israeli security officials at campaign events. When at least two other candidates attempted to campaign in Jerusalem, they were detained by Israeli authorities on the grounds that they had not acquired a permit or because they were said to have exceeded the scope of the permit that had been issued. In some cases, the permits issued to candidates granted permission only for a private visit, so that any campaign activity might be construed as a violation.

It was impossible to determine to what extent Palestinian citizens were prevented or discouraged from attending campaign events because of restrictions on their movement. Undoubtedly, there was some effect. It appears, however, that average Palestinians were 004 Tc0.24TcTc0.0

possibility of lopsided campaigning and prevents the transparency needed to establish and maintain public confidence in the media and the election process.

Use of Public Resources and Campaign Financing. There were significant differences among the candidates concerning their access to campaign resources. One complaint raised by several presidential candidates and others was the apparent use of resources of the Palestinian Authority (PA) by government officials for the benefit of the Fatah candidate. The CEC criticized some PA officials for campaigni

more than once. However, the limited time available for voter education proved insufficient to communicate to many voters where they should vote.

During the 2004 voter registration process, the CEC introduced proxy registration for Palestinians who were in jail or detention, including those in Israeli custody. A case was taken to the Israeli High Court seeking to allow such prisoners to vote in the January 9 presidential election. The court rejected the petition on the grounds that it was not administratively feasible to organize voting in time for the election; this left open the possibility of Palestinian prisoners and detainees voting in future elections.

Voting in Jerusalem. The status of the city of Jerusalem created unique challenges for the election. During the recent voter registration, there was no formal agreement between Israel and the Palestinians regarding registration for Jerusalemites, and the centers in East Jerusalem were shut down by Israeli authorities after the first 10 days of a planned five-week process. However, the CEC conducted door-to-door registration canvassing after the presidential election was set. For the January 9 presidential election, the Palestinian Authority and Israeli government agreed to return to the terms of the agreement they entered for the 1996 Palestinian elections.

In 1996, Palestinians cast ballots in five post offices in Jerusalem. This time the number was expanded to six. The Israeli government considered this a form of absentee voting; the Palestinian authorities considered it voting in polling stations that happened to be post offices. Under the agreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government, approximately 6,000 voters were eligible to vote at the post offices.

Voting was overseen by Israeli postal workers, many of whom are Palestinians, but no Palestinian election officials were allowed on site. International observers were allowed to witness the procedures. All but one of the facilities were small and could not accommodate many voters inside their premises at any one time. Regular ballot boxes were not used, but ballots were deposited in "receptacles". Counting was not done on the spot, and ballots were transported to CEC officials by Israeli postal vehicles. Security of the post offices during the voting process was the responsibility of Israeli authorities.

In addition to voting in the six post offices, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem were allowed to vote outside the city at 12 voting centers. The CEC estimates that approximately 90,000 such voters would need to travel to the 12 centers outside Jerusalem even though the travel could be difficult.

The arrangement for Jerusalem's Palestinian voters was inadequate and likely discouraged voter turnout. In addition, Palestinians living in Jerusalem(ia)4.7(ns liviTc0.1591 TJ17.895 elec)l1TJ-29.

ELECTION DAY

Election day was orderly and generally pea

names were not on the voter lists. This process was to be verified by international observers.

The agreement eased tensions at the post offices and allowed a significant number of eligible voters to cast ballots who may otherwise have been disenfranchised. Inconsistent application of the agreement at the various post offices also caused some confusion and uneven opportunities to vote for some Palestinians. For future elections, restrictions on Palestinian voting in Jerusalem should be addressed.

Many expressed concerns in the lead-up to the election that Israeli checkpoints and barriers would seriously hinder election day activities. In response, the Israeli Ministry for Foreign

APPENDIX B

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Jerusalem, 22 December 2004

This statement has been prepared by a pre-election assessment team organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with The Carter Center (TCC). The delegation examined technical preparations and the political environment leading up to the presidential election in the West Bank and Gaza, currently scheduled for Sunday, 9 January 2005. From 13-20 December 2004, the delegation conducted a series of meetings with electoral authorities, campaign representatives, Palestinian and Israeli governmental officials, representatives of domestic and international monitoring organizations, political party and civic leaders, and representatives of the international community.

The delegation included: Leslie Campbell, NDI Senior Associate and Director of Middle East and North Africa programs; Jennifer Collins-Foley, an election administration and voter education expert; Joseph Hall, NDI Senior Regional Representative for Middle East and North Africa programs; Matthe

leadership to emerge and is a serious impediment to little-known political contestants. Name recognition and access to resources by better-known candidates may play a disproportionate role in determining the winner of the January 2005 contest. Political party activity and voter education, both key elements of an ongoing democratization process, will not reach the level that might be expected in a presidential race.

These potential shortcomings result from following a legal mandate to call an election within 60 days of the death of the president and should not necessarily be viewed as hampering the

military occupation and curfew. Since the beginning of the second *intifada*, movement in between villages, towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza has been severely restricted.

Restricted movement has implications for a successful election process. If election officials cannot deliver the materials and training to each polling station and poll worker, the franchise of certain voters may be compromised. If candidates and political party officials are not free to reach out to and communicate directly with voters, an opportunity to strengthen the relationship between citizen and elected leadership – important in both the short and long term – may be lost. Candidates who do not already have substantial political support may be at a disadvantage if their travel is restricted.

Israeli and Palestinian officials have stated in the press that there exists an agreement that will allow freedom of movement for political candidates and their assistants and elections workers. They have further stated that Palestinian voters will enjoy freedom of movement in the 72 hours surrounding election day. The details of this reported agreement have not been publicized.006-3iTD0at Pu been

residents of Jerusalem will not face any negative consequences for exercising their right to vote may help increase voter turnout.

The CEC estimates that the total number of possible Palestinian voters in Jerusalem may exceed 200,000. Some of the five post offices used in 1996 could accommodate the presence of only six voters at one time, and that calculation does not take into consideration observers and the media who will undoubtedly pay special

Voter Education, Communication and Domestic Election Observation

To date, voters have received limited information on the new system for voting. Additionally, agreements on freedom of movement and voting in East Jerusalem referenced by Palestinian and Israeli officials, have not been detailed to the public, nor have Palestinian and Israeli officials yet made sufficient efforts to reassure the Palestinian public that such agreements will be faithfully implemented. In an information vacuum, Palestinian political parties and voters may not have the confidence to campaign and vote in the numbers they might in other circumstances.

The death of Yasser Arafat and the short election preparation time seems to have limited the scope and depth of voter education activities. Anecdotal information suggests that Palestinians are largely unaware of the details of the presidential vote, and know little about most of the candidates running. This situation may well be remedied during the official campaign period but it is an issue that bears further attention.

Palestinian non-governmental organizations are organizing a domestic election observation exercise. The CEC reports that as many as 10,000 domestic monitors are expected to register to observe the presidential election. Despite this admirable level of activity, it is unclear whether a comprehensive voter education campaign will be part of these efforts.

Recommendations

1) *Freedom of Movement*: The ability of election officials, candidates, campaign teams and political party officials to move freely throughout the West Bank and Gaza will have a profound affect on the quality of the campaign and the election itself. As noted in this statement, Israeli officials have stated their willingness to facilitate the requirements of these elections. To this end, NDI recommends that election officials and workers receive full freedom of movement and access to all necessary areas immediately.

Additionally, candidates for the presidency, their campaign staff and political party officials should receive the same facilitation of movement as soon as possible, and certainly no later than the start of the official campaign period.

Also, all voters must have full freedom of movement from at least 8 – 10 January for the purposes of reaching voting centers. The election law requires citizens to register and vote where they live for national elections, which will undoubtedly require travel for some. Additionally, many voters on the civil registry will have to go to special voting centers, which are less numerous than regular voting centers and therefore less conveniently located.

2) *Jerusalem*: Time is running out to reach an agreement on voting in Jerusalem that could be implemented in time for election day, both in terms of the meeting technical requirements for operating an election and fully informing voters of the systems in place for voting.

Jerusalemites need explicit reassurances from Israeli and Palestinian officials that exercising their voting rights in the January elections will not lead to sanctions in any form. NDI recommends that any agreement reached include specific protections and guarantees that voters in East Jerusalem will not suffer any consequences as a result of participating in these elections. On election day, a judicious deployment of Israeli security forces around polling

stations will serve as an important confidence building measure that these guarantees are genuine.

Additionally, NDI recommends that any agreement reached should expand the number of locations used for purposes of voting. The Institute also recommends that special consideration be given to the training of poll workers, who are postal workers rather than CEC employees, and the transportation of ballots.

3) *Voter Education and Communication*: Recent amendments to the election law and the CEC's plans for incorporating the new regulations into this election, have led to a complicated system for voting on election day. Voters who recently registered with the CEC must return to the site where they registered to vote, while those only on the civil registry

APPENDIX C

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE REGISTRATION OF PALESTINIAN VOTERS SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004

Jerusalem, 7 October 2004

This statement has been prepared by a multinational delegation organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). The observer mission assessed the voter registration process in the West Bank and Gaza throughout the official five-week period, beginning on 4 September with the majority of field visits to registration centers conducted between 27 September and 7 October. Among its activities, the mission visited 117 registration sites, conducted a series of meetings with political and civic leaders, governmental and electoral authorities, and representatives of the international community.

The observer mission included experts in elections, voter registration and democratic development from seven countries. Several were selected because of their unique understanding of these fields in areas of conflict. The delegation included:

Paul Adams, former Middle East Bureau Chief for *The Globe and Mail* and former NDI Senior Program Director in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; Shari Bryan, an attorney experienced in civil, criminal and international law who has led election monitoring missions in a number of countries and currently serves as NDI's Regional Director of Southern and East Africa Programs; Kate Fearon, founding member of and political advisor to the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and currently Political Party Program Director for NDI in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joseph Hall, currently NDI Senior Regional Representative for the Middle East and former director of several NDI programs, including those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; Richard Klein, a Senior Elections Advisor to NDI programs, co-author of the manual, "Building Confidence in the Voter Registration Process"; Shannon O'Connell, a specialist in campaigns, elections and political party development and Director of NDI's programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; Sasha Pajevic, NDI Resident Deputy Director for Political Party Programs with NDI Montenegro; Vladimir Pran, a Senior Elections Advisor to NDI programs and former director of Parallel Vote Tabulation for GONG, a nonpartisan citizens organization in his native Croatia; David Rose, Deputy Leader of the Progressive Unionist Party of Northern Ireland and a specialist in democratic and transformation processes in conflict regions; Bjarte Tørå, former International Secretary and Deputy Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Party of Norway and Resident Director of NDI's programs in Kenya; Félix Ulloa, a former magistrate with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in El Salvador and presently Resident Director of NDI's programs in Haiti.

The purpose of the NDI observation effort is to assist in the development of viable democratic institutions that will enable Palestinians to choose their leaders and representatives freely. NDI began work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994 in anticipation of the first Palestinian general elections. In 1996, NDI organized an international observer mission that monitored the preparations for Palestinian elections and later the balloting process itself. From 1996 to 1998, the Institute also supported the effort of Palestinian groups that monitored those polls. NDI worked with the Palestinian Legislative Council and assisted in the development of Civic Forum, a civic education initiative.

Currently, NDI is assisting in the efforts of Palestinian parties and factions to develop their capacity to participate in the emerging democratic process.

Beginning in September, the Palestinian Central Election Commission (CEC) undertook to assemble a new register of Palestinian voters for use in municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections. In order to express the international community's support for democratic elections to Palestinian institutions, NDI organized a delegation of observers to monitor the process. The possibility of democratic progress for Palestinians is a matter of deep interest not only to Palestinians themselves but also to the region and to the world. A credible and fairly administered voter registration system is a prerequisite to any democratic reform.

During the last two weeks, delegation members visited 117 registration centers representing all the governorates in the West Bank and selected by statistical sample. Because of armed conflict in the Gaza Strip, NDI's observers were unable to witness the operation of registration centers there. However, local staff did conduct 20 observation visits in Gaza. In addition, NDI intends to dispatch international observers to monitor registration centers in Gaza when they re-open, as the CEC has promised, and when security circumstances permit.

The comments contained herein represent NDI's preliminary conclusions based on the first of three phases of the observation process. Once the CEC publishes the register of voters, NDI will conduct physical tests of the list to determine whether voters have been properly inscribed and to ensure that names have not been improperly inserted onto the list. In the final stage of its observation program, NDI will monitor the process that permits challenges to the list in November.

NDI intends to publish a comprehensive report on the voter registration process in December.

Summary of Observations

The registration of Palestinian voters, which began on September 4, 2004, took place under extraordinarily difficult conditions. During the registration period there were armed clashes and Israeli military operations, particularly in the north of the Gaza Strip. Smaller incursions, military operations, and checkpoints also complicated the logistical tasks of establishing and supplying registration centers as well as training staff. Despite these obstacles, over a five-week period, the Central Election Commission (CEC) undertook to draw up an entirely new register of Palestinian voter

the centers were well supplied with the necessary materials. The centers were for the most part well identified with large banners and were numerous enough that most people were able to access them by foot. The CEC also introduced a system of proxy registration for Palestinians in jail or detention.

Furthermore, the Commission proved itself responsive in the face of many of the difficulties it inevitably faced in mounting an entirely new process. During the course of the registration period, it adopted a special procedure for home-registration of the elderly and the disabled who found it difficult to travel to registration centers. Early in the registration process, when turnout at the stationary registration centers was lower than might have been hoped, the CEC devised a successful system of mobile registration centers located near busy areas such as markets and mosques to augment the work of the stationary centers. These centers signed up many people who might not otherwise have taken the trouble to register.

Most important for the future of Palestinian elections, the CEC conducted itself impartially. This is crucial for the restoration of the confidence of Palestinians in their electoral system. The system of compiling the voters' list by door-to-door canvass in the 1996 election was hastily designed, and although some voters found it more convenient than the current system, it was also more open to manipulation or abuse. The NDI observer team was unanimous in its view that the quality of the CEC's work during this voter registration process was unusual, if not unique, in a conflict zone. While some of its decisions have been the subject of debate, the Commission established its credibility and integrity during the process.

The responsibility for making the registration system work does not lie solely with the CEC. Political and civic organizations also had a responsibility to mobilize in order to ensure its success. Although many of these organizations were slow to mobilize support for the registration process, there is evidence that some of them became increasingly active as the process unfolded. The CEC informed NDI that 6,500 domestic observers and agents had registered to participate as of 6 October.

It is clear that public acceptance of the registration process has grown over the past five weeks. The number of people registering each day roughly doubled from the beginning of the five-week initial registration period to the end. In many communities a majority, and in some a very large majority, of eligible voters have now registered. From the information NDI has been able to obtain through its observation activities and discussions with the CEC, it appears that roughly 900,000 Palestinians have been registered to vote so far. While this is a significant achievement, NDI believes that there remain many more Palestinians who would be interested and prepared to register to vote. In some areas, particularly in refugee camps and some of the larger cities, registration rates were relatively low. NDI believes that a larger number of registered voters would lend greater legitimacy to elections when they are held.

Despite the achievements of the initial registration experience, there are a number of serious problems that need to be addressed.

1. *Access to registration in Jerusalem:* The CEC established seven registration centers in East Jerusalem. However, in their first week of operation they were subject to frequent raids by Israeli authorities, according to staff in the centers we interviewed. This intimidated staff and discouraged potential registrants, they said. After a little more than a week, all the centers in East Jerusalem were closed under Israeli directives. Some CEC officials in East Jerusalem were detained and later told our

observers that they were threatened with arrest if they did not discontinue their work. Although the CEC did react by establishing some centers outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, they attracted few voters. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are required by Israeli authorities to carry special identity cards permitting them to live in the city; many said they feared losing their right to live in Jerusalem if they were found by Israeli authorities to have registered. The result was that tens of thousands of Palestinians in East Jerusalem were denied the opportunity to register and have thus been potentially disfranchised.

2. *Registration problems in areas of conflict:* Military clashes in the north of the Gaza Strip resulted in the indefinite closure of dozens of registration centers. In addition, more localized military actions by Israeli forces elsewhere in Gaza and in the West Bank resulted in the temporary closure of many registration centers, in some cases for extended periods. Election officials also reported that the presence of Israeli soldiers or military vehicles close to registration centers had sometimes discouraged potential registrants even when the centers remained open.
3. *Movement of registration forms:* The CEC informed NDI that it had been unable to secure passage of an estimated 300,000 registration forms out of Gaza through Israeli-controlled border stations. Because the CEC's data-processing center is in Ramallah, this may delay the preparation of the voters' lists, an issue of particular concern for municipalities in which local elections are scheduled for December.
4. *Public participation:* Many voters demonstrated an initial lack of enthusiasm to the idea of registering to vote, particularly because no date has been set for presidential or parliamentary elections. Despite the CEC's publicity campaign, scepticism about the possibility of elections and their potential impact has only slowly given way to growing interest. In some areas, significant numbers of people have only started coming to the registration centers in recent days.
5. *Municipal elections:* The Palestinian Authority (PA) has called for local elections to be held in 36 of its approximately 500 municipalities on December 9. The PA has said that it intends to call elections in all the municipalities over the next year. However, local elections are currently regulated by a different law than parliamentary and presidential elections. Confusingly for voters, the rules for voting in local elections are different and there is a separate system of registering to vote. NDI was told that the committees organizing local elections will rely in part on the work done by the CEC, but this is certainly not sufficient to reduce voter confusion or eliminate unnecessary administrative duplication.

The NDI observer team believes that all of these issues can and should be addressed. Doing so would contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of Palestinian elections.

Interim Recommendations

1. *Access to registration in Jerusalem:* The closure of registration centers in East Jerusalem illustrates how difficult it will be for Palestinians there to exercise their voting rights without a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Prior to the 1996 election, an agreement was negotiated between the Palestinian Authority and Israel that allowed Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote.

NDI recognizes that the political situation has deteriorated since then. Nonetheless, NDI would urge the parties to seek an accommodation that will allow Palestinians in East Jerusalem to cast their ballots.

2. *Extending registration in conflict areas:* The CEC should reiterate its commitment to extend the registration period in areas, notably in the Gaza Strip, where registration has been seriously disrupted by armed conflict.
3. *Movement of registration forms:* Israel cooperated with the movement of registration materials into the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the registration process. NDI recommends that Israel continue this cooperation by allowing the movement of registration forms from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank in a way that ensures the integrity of these documents. At the same time, NDI encourages the CEC to accommodate Israel's legitimate security concerns in a way consistent with its own duties to protect the registration process.
4. *Ensuring full access to registration:* The current registration process will allow the CEC to form the basis of a permanent, regularly updated voters list. NDI supports the CEC's decision to allow a general extension of the current registration period beyond this week. This will help ensure more of those who wish to register are able to do so. The CEC should also expand its use of the mobile registration centers in high-traffic areas that have already proven effective in augmenting the reach of local centers. To be most effective, these measures should be accompanied by a continuation of the CEC's publicity campaign. Moreover, to ensure that no interested eligible voter is denied the franchise, NDI would recommend that the CEC introduce methods to update the register, particularly when election dates have been announced. This will be a time when voter interest is likely to be high. NDI realizes that this is an expensive endeavor. We acknowledge the generosity of foreign donors, particularly members of the European Union, in supporting the process so far, and urge the international community to continue its support.
5. *Clarifying procedures for municipal elections:* NDI commends the CEC and the Local Government Ministry for their efforts to cooperate. However, the best way to minimize confusion among voters and ensure the fair and efficient conduct of municipal elections would be to harTJ-1p5orm

APPENDIX D

MAP OF POLLING CENTERS IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP AND EAST JERUSALEM



- 998 regular polling centers (green dots)
- 64 civil registry polling centers (purple dots)
- 6 post offices for “absentee” voting in East Jerusalem

APPENDIX F

NDI Election Observation Mission Palestinian Presidential Election January 9, 2005

Delegation Leadership Group

Jimmy Carter

Delegation Co-Leader
Former President of the United States

Carl Bildt

Delegation Co-Leader
Former Prime Minister of Sweden

Christine Todd Whitman

Delegation Co-Leader
Former Governor of New Jersey
Former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), United States

Lois Capps

Member of Congress
United States

Gefarina Djohan

Deputy Secretary General, National Awakening Party (PKB)
Indonesia

Kamal Hossain

President of the People's Forum Party
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bangladesh

Zlatko Lagumdžija

President of the Social Democratic Party
Former Prime Minister
Bosnia-Herzegovina

Jeanne Shaheen

Former Governor of New Hampshire
United States

Kenneth Wollack

President, National Democratic Institute
United States

Delegation Members

Paul Adams

Former Resident Director, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic
Institute Former Middle East Correspondent, Globe and Mail
Canada

Lara Shahriyar Alameh

Professional Staff, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives
United States

Harriet Babbitt

Former US Ambassador to the Organization for American States
Former USAID Deputy Administrator
Board Member, National Democratic Institute
United States

Eric Bjornlund

Founder and Principal, Democracy International
Former Regional Director, Asia, National Democratic Institute
United States

Leslie Campbell

Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa,
National Democratic Institute
Canada

David Carroll

Interim Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center
United States

James E. Carter III

Consultant, The Carter Center
United States

Jennifer Collins-Foley
Election Administration Consultant
United States

Charles Costello
Former Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center
Former Director, Democracy Center, USAID
United States

Rita DiMartino
Vice Chair, New York Republican Party
Board Member, National Endowment for Democracy
United States

Joy Drucker
Vice President, Stonebridge International LLC
Former Deputy Director, Washington office of the Council on Foreign
Relations
United States

Lara Friedman
Former Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State
United States

Larry Garber
Former USAID Mission Director, West Bank and Gaza Strip
United States

Rebecca Haessig
Former Resident Senior Program Officer, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National
Democratic Institute
United States

Joseph Hall
Senior Regional Representative, Middle East and North Africa,
National Democratic Institute
United States

Shirley Robinson Hall
Former US Public Delegate to the United Nations
Board Member, National Democratic Institute
United States

Jamie Hanley
Member of Labour Party National Policy Forum
United Kingdom

Hussain Haqqani
Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Pakistan

Matthew Hodes
Director, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center
United States

Kevin Johnson
Senior Partner and Co-founder of the Liberty Global Partners
Former Resident Director, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National
Democratic Institute
United States

Ronald Johnson
President, NOW Communications Group Inc.
Canada

Emre Kocaoglu
President, Turkish Democracy Foundation
Turkey

Joan Marie Komlos
Former Director of Media, US Commission on Presidential Debates
United States

Scott Lasensky
United States Institute of Peace
United States

Alexander Longolious
Former Speaker Pro Tem, Berlin State House of Representatives
Germany

Zoran Lucic
Executive Director, CeSID
Serbia

Lewis Manilow

Former Chair of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
Board Member, National Democratic Institute
United States

Mona Makram-Ebeid

Secretary General, Al-Ghad Party
Egypt

Audrey McLaughlin

Former Member of Parliament and leader of the New Democratic Party
Resident Senior Program Director, Morocco, National Democratic Institute
Canada

Monica McWilliams

Former Representative, Northern Ireland Assembly
Professor of Women's Studies and Social Policy, University of Ulster
Northern Ireland

Patrick Merloe

Senior Associate and Director of Election Processes, National Democratic
Institute
United States

Olga Milosavljevic

Marketing Director, Charles Schwab and Assoc.
Former election observer, Central & Eastern Europe and Middle East
United States

Abdelaziz Nouaydi

Professor of International Law
Member of the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights (OMDH)
Morocco

Shannon O'Connell

Resident Director, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic Institute
United States

Molly Raiser

Former Chief of Protocol, US Department of State
Chair, United States Committee United Nations High Commission for
Refugees,
Board Member, National Democratic Institute

United States

M.J. Rosenberg

Middle East Analyst

United States

Mara Rudman

Senior Vice President for Strategic Planning, Center for American Progress

Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

United States

Ranjit Singh

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Mary Washington

Former Resident Representative, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National

Democratic Institute

United States

Jozefina Topalli

Deputy Speaker of Parliament

Albania

Berna Turkili

Founder of European Movement 2002 and co-founder of KaDer

Turkey

Deborah Ullmer

General Manager, Palestinian Election Program, National Democratic Institute

Francisco Virtuoso

Director of the Gumilla Center and member of Ojo Electoral

Venezuela

Deanna Congileo

Press secretary to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Director of Public

Information, The Carter Center

Avery Davis-Roberts

Desk Officer, Middle East and Southern Africa, The Carter Center

Robert Ellzey

Advance Director, The Carter Center

Nancy Konigsmark

Director of Scheduling for former President Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center

Joshua Roberts

Desk Officer, Middle East and Central Asia, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center

Roula Attar

Resident Program Officer, Jordan, National Democratic Institute

Yousef Awadallah

Resident Project Assistant, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic Institute

Tanya Awwad

Administrative Officer, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic Institute

Michael Baldassaro

Program Assistant, Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute

Caroline Baxter

Regional Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute

Rula Daghas

Resident Project Assistant, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic Institute

Ghadeer Dajani

Resident Senior Program Assistant, West Bank and Gaza Strip, National Democratic Institute

Sighle Doherty

Administrative Director, Executive Office

APPENDIX G

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE OBSERVATION MISSION







